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Introduction
The West German postwar political consensus was shaken in the 1970s by a wave
of citizen protest. The protest was often directed at large, state-sponsored industrial
projects such as nuclear and coal-fired power plants. Citizens objected not only to the
environmental degradation caused by these projects, but also to a system of planning that
excluded local residents from decisions that would affect the character of their
communities. In this sense the protest was about democratic legitimacy. Focusing on the
city of Berlin, I argue that the protests of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in both a more
activist citizenry and a more participatory planning process. I then examine how
participation in land-use planning has evolved in Berlin since German unification. I find
that, while the desire to mitigate conflict has led planners to incorporate local citizen
input, institutional and attitudinal barriers to inclusive, effective planning remain which
keep the legitimation issue alive. Grassroots protest is still an oft-used and necessary tool
to draw attention to the local effects of development decisions and to democratic deficits
in the planning process.
This article draws connections between the social movement and urban planning
literatures, which have remained largely separate. Cases of local conflict in land-use
planning can speak to important questions about the nature of citizen participation in
industrialized democracies. A look at citizen protest around planning issues over a thirtyyear span in Berlin reveals the following:
1. Protesters intentionally politicized areas of policy making that had formerly been
accepted as the purview of technical experts. The Berlin case shows how the protests of
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the 1970s linked the goals of grassroots democracy and community quality of life in a
way that has had lasting impact on the land-use planning process. The protesters asserted
that only a democratic decision making process could produce legitimate and competent
policy. This is a significant change from the technocratic mentality of the past, and it sits
uneasily with the government goal of increasing bureaucratic efficiency.
2. Citizen protest is commonly viewed in the social movement literature as temporary
or cyclical: As governments react to protest, either by suppressing it or by engaging in
bargaining with the movements, the mobilization dies down. In fact, the movements of
the 1970s in Germany did professionalize somewhat and become more a part of
institutionalized politics. Protest mobilization, however, did not disappear in the ensuing
decades, but rather, as Dieter Rucht points out, also became part of the "normal"
repertoire of local citizens.1 A look at the evolution of local planning politics in a single
city over time helps explain this result. Citizen and state roles have both changed in
Berlin; citizen participation is taken more seriously, while the state behaves less
autonomously. This is a difference that the mobilization of the 1970s produced. But the
struggle to find a workable, legitimate forum for citizen participation continues. New
political parties and increased participation requirements in planning have not proven
adequate. Grassroots protests are still commonly mounted in the name of community
empowerment against what many see as unwanted encroachments by an industrialbureaucratic growth machine.
The Berlin case yields insights into land-use politics in Germany as a whole.
While the city's history is in some ways unique, in other, important ways Berlin is a kind
of extreme case that can be instructive generally. The conditions that produced
grassroots protest around land-use nationwide were particularly acute here. Hemmed in
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by the infamous Wall, West Berlin in the 1970s and 1980s faced the challenges of
urbanization without the means to disperse the negative effects. The state government's
decision to expand the city's electrical capacity in hopes of fostering industrial growth
would have negative implications for a substantial part of the population no matter where
a new power plant was sited. The environmental costs of continued economic expansion
became especially apparent where industry and populace were forced to coexist in a
limited space. West Berliners also had little chance of influencing planning decisions by
the neighboring East German government whose consequences they, too, would suffer.
In this way the walled-in city served as a kind of future scenario for other urbanized areas
whose environmental problems transcended their political borders and whose ability to
deal with them by dispersion was limited. The "economy-ecology conflict" that
prompted the rise of the environmental movement nationwide was particularly acute in
West Berlin and produced a particularly active grassroots protest scene. But the kind of
protest that occurred in Berlin also occurred around other large industrial projects and
was responsible in part for the nationwide boom in grassroots organizations and the
founding of green/alternative political groupings.
Today, too, Berlin faces magnified land-use problems which continue to spark
grassroots protest. The challenges of unification are particularly stark in the only major
German metropolitan area containing both eastern and western components. The sudden
opening of borders to a sparsely populated hinterland has also made clear the need for
functioning regional land-use planning. Here, too, Berlin holds lessons for the rest of
Germany in its search for effective participatory planning instruments.
Bureaucratic/political attempts to streamline planning clash with citizens' demands to
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shape their own community. The study begins by describing the conditions that sparked
the mass mobilization of the 1970s.

West German Land-Use Planning and the Rise of Citizen Protest
While the federal government sets the general framework for land-use planning,
the concrete details are developed at state (Land) and local levels. Zoning, urban
development, and landscape management are the responsibility of municipalities and
counties. All matters involving the local governments are constitutionally their
responsibility except where specifically assigned to other levels of government.2 Mutual
cooperation, however, is the norm. Alan Norton writes, "important as the separation of
powers between territorial levels may be in law, in political terms there is...an
intertwining of activities...and a high degree of interdependence between the Bund,
Länder and local government and between them and other sectoral interests..."3 Citystates like Berlin are exceptional in that they possess state and local governments at the
same time. Under the state government, which in Berlin is called the Senate (Senat), are
city districts (Bezirke); while city districts lack independent fiscal power, they do
participate in land-use planning. It was the state government of West Berlin, though,
which controlled the administrative planning process in the 1970s, when our story begins.
In this period the sectoral interests involved in the siting process were mostly energy
firms themselves. The shared federal and state priority of economic growth led these
authorities to want to expand energy capacity even in the face of stagnant demand.
The 1970s also saw the rise of social movements organized not along traditional
lines of economic conflict, but around new issues of quality of life and a critique of
growth.4 The upsurge in citizen protest began as West Germany's "economic miracle"
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slowed and information on the harmful effects of pollution became widely available.
Many local populations began to question the government's continued support of
industrial growth at the expense of the natural environment and to formulate their critique
in terms of an economy/ecology conflict. Local residents formed "citizen initiative"
groups. These were generally single-issue neighborhood or local groups organized either
to procure some service for the community or, as was overwhelmingly the case beginning
in the early 1970s, to protest some government-sponsored project or policy. Near
Frankfurt's busy international airport, plans to deforest a recreational area in order to
construct a new runway drew mass protest. In West Berlin, a freeway extension project
was blocked for decades by residents' objections. Mass mobilization reached its height in
the protest against nuclear energy facilities, including reactors at Wyhl, Brokdorf,
Grohnde, and Kalkar and recycling facilities at Gorleben and later Wackersdorf. At their
peak, the environmental demonstrations drew hundreds of thousands of participants.5
Although the energy issue most clearly evoked critique of the growth mentality,
energy protest was embedded in a larger array of citizen movements concerned with the
quality of life and critical of what Jürgen Habermas termed the economic and
administrative "system".6 Women's rights, civil rights, antiwar, and labor groups had
proliferated in the 1960s. Urban centers such as West Berlin became centers of a thriving
left-wing student movement and alternative culture. Although there was little overlap
between the protest groups of the 1960s and the environmental citizen initiatives of the
1970s, some of the later groups built on the communication network established by
especially the left-wing organizations. The peace movement, composed of a variety of
smaller groups, also emerged strongly in the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly after the
stationing of nuclear missiles on West German soil.7 Disgruntled citizens began to
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question not only the substance of government decisions, but also the legitimacy of the
form of decision making that produced them. They blamed the tight relationship between
government and industry for policy decisions unrepresentative of the values of much of
the population. They increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties,
which in their view had failed to transmit new impulses from the citizenry to political
decision makers. The view spread among the activists that the problems were not merely
a passing phase but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in
the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."8
By the mid-1970s more people described themselves as members of citizen
initiatives than of all political parties combined.9 Although the average participant was
well educated and middle class, these groups contained a broad cross-section of citizens.
While they opposed technocratic decision making, they were not generally backward
looking; they supported technological solutions to environmental problems so long as
these were reached democratically. Grassroots groups developed a broad palette of
political activities, including petition campaigns, nature walks, information booths,
demonstrations, site occupations, and festivals. Some of the left-wing and other citizen
groups joined environmentalists to found new political parties and voting lists in the late
1970s, culminating in the 1980 formation of the national-level Greens.
The federal government responded with anti-pollution and construction legislation
containing expanded provisions for citizen participation. Additions to the Federal Air
Pollution Law linked the permit requirements for polluting facilities; now proposals
would have to include precautions against environmental damage in order to qualify for
construction permits. This change closed a loophole that had often allowed projects to
begin construction before their environmental impacts had been assessed. The new law
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permitted citizens to file objections, provided they could show that the proposed project
would affect them negatively.

Energy Controversy in West Berlin
In this setting, the controversy arose that would help reshape West Berlin politics.
Berlin Power and Light (BEWAG) announced in the mid-1970s its most ambitious project
to date, a planned 1,200 megawatt coal-fired plant to be built in a forested area in the
northwest corner of the city. Rising demand, the utility claimed, mandated immediate
expansion if the city were to avert an energy shortage. The subsequent debate over the
construction revealed a conflict between the goal of revitalizing West Berlin's lagging
industrial sector, a goal to which a plentiful and secure energy supply could contribute,
and the goal of reversing the deterioration of the natural environment, whose
accomplishment the project could hinder. The former goal clearly took priority among
policymakers in the West Berlin state government, the latter among a substantial portion
of the citizenry.
There were limited sites available on which to build the city's largest plant. The
property chosen was away from residential areas but was squarely in the middle one of
the largest areas of contiguous forest in the city. The initial siting choice was made by
the Senate's energy bureaucracy, which was also the main permit authority for power
plants, together with the utility. The public reaction was immediate and explosive:
nearby residents formed a citizen intiative group that drew citywide attention to the site
through demonstrations, information booths, weekend nature walks through the
threatened forest, tree adoptions, and, finally, site occupation. The West Berlin group,
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like other new social movements that formed around energy projects, linked the issues of
environment and democracy:
My dream is neither to have a state led by citizen initiative groups nor a
state constituted by industry and trade interests. My dream would be a
government guided by the question of human survival, that would not
push the costs of our current lifestyle onto the next generation like an
ever-growing mountain, that would at least make an attempt to discuss the
costs...with us instead of playing us for fools, and that would decide with
us how these costs could be justly assigned...10
The activists objected to the scale and location of the project and its predicted
negative environmental effects, but they also questioned the legitimacy of the form of
decision making that had led to these planning choices. In this way they connected the
aims of democracy and community quality of life - only an inclusive decision making
process, they argued, could produce sustainable, community-friendly policy. Noting the
negligible role of elected officials in energy policy making, the activists concentrated on
grassroots action and direct confrontation of bureaucratic policy makers. The West
Berlin Senate, faced with conflicting demands from the utility and the protesters, tried to
bypass the parliamentary and citizen-participation provisions of the permit process. It
exempted the utility from the legal requirement to submit a construction plan on the
grounds that energy demand made large and rapid expansion imperative.11
Given the nature of the protesters' objections, this was exactly the wrong move. It
reinforced the protesters' claim that the Senate's decisionmaking was undemocratic. The
group filed suit in administrative court. Protesters literally threw themselves in front of
bulldozers to block preliminary drilling at the forested site until the court could hear their
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objection. The West Berlin Administrative Court sided with the protesters. The court
nullified the exemptions from the citizen participation requirements of federal air
pollution and construction laws. The judge said the energy shortage the Senate projected
"was clearly the fault of the [Senate] itself through its own bureaucratic failures [and]
cannot be considered an emergency situation of the kind that could justify an exemption
from the existing planning obligations."12
The utility downscaled the project and moved the plant site to a less
environmentally sensitive location next to an existing plant. The controversy then shifted
to the permit processes. The citizen challenge, previously expressed through mass
mobilization, was now increasingly aimed directly at the bureaucracy's source of
legitimacy: its technical expertise. The permit authorities faced difficult adjustments.
The new federal construction and air pollution laws dispersed decision-making power
within the Senate bureaucracy. The Senator for Economy could no longer control the
process as in the past; now the environmental and worker protection bureaucracies were
also involved. Any lack of coordination between the branches, as well as permit
authorities' overreliance on data supplied by the utility itself, quickly came to light in the
permit hearings.
Citizen pressure began to stir both the administrative courts and the West Berlin
state parliament to cast a more critical eye on utility and Senate data. But the narrow
technical debate frustrated the citizens' attempts to raise general questions regarding the
form and goals of policy making. Permit authorities were simply not required to take
broader considerations of the goals of planning into account. The activists increasingly
targeted the political parties in the legislature for failing to provide an independent forum
for energy debate and for failing to take up their institutional right to oversee Senate
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policy making. Local activists, including many Reuter-West protesters, formed their own
voting list, the Alternative List (AL), which first won seats in 1981 with 7.2% of the vote.
AL members immediately brought the planning/energy debate to parliament. The AL
prompted the formation of two special commissions to study energy policy and to prepare
the legislature to take on its supervisory role.13
The biggest challenge for the utility was complying with air pollution standards.
BEWAG was able to do that by modernizing or shutting down parts of older plants while
constructing the new one at half the originally proposed capacity. West Berlin's already
marginal air quality would not be worsened, and in some parts of the city would actually
improve, through these measures. This was a victory for citizen activism. The
controversy also forced the government to comply with the new federal laws by including
a wider range of considerations in individual planning decisions. This change would also
invite a wider range of participants into the process. The need for a more synoptic
approach became clear during the legal battle. The activists' viewpoint repeatedly won
the support of the courts. Plant opponents won a further victory, for example, when the
administrative court voided the construction permits on grounds that the permit
authorities had failed to take air pollution control standards into account in awarding
them. The authorities had argued that environmental considerations belonged to a
separate permit process under air pollution law and were not properly part of construction
permitting. Federal law no longer allowed these authorities to compartmentalize different
aspects of planning.14 Likewise, the open discussion of interests - how, for example,
environmental and economic concerns should be weighed in planning - became part of
the legal as well as the parliamentary discussion. It was now considered irresponsible for
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elected officials not to examine critically the planning decisions of the bureaucracy and
the utility.
The universal recognition that energy policy involves choices between political
goals was in part the achievement of a decade of legal wrangling over the Reuter-West
power plant. The protesters and the AL intentionally politicized what had been a
technical discussion. They connected in the public mind grassroots democracy in
planning with community quality of life.

Results of 1970s-1980s Grassroots Protest in West Berlin and Nationwide
The West Berlin controversy occurred in the context of widespread grassroots
protest against state-sponsored industrial projects. Everywhere, the protesters challenged
not only the negative environmental consequences of planning decisions but also the
legitimacy of the technocratic planning system. Citizen protest led to the founding of
green and alternative parties and networks of citizen groups throughout West Germany.
These parties formed a lasting tie between the challengers and the political
establishment.15 Pushed by the new activists, parliaments in almost all the federal states
established principles and guiding goals for land-use planning.
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In West Berlin, the AL

augmented its support through the 1980s and became part of a short-lived governing
coalition with the Social Democrats in 1989.17 The AL, though, like many green and
alternative parties, was unable to force much institutional change in the democratizing
direction the citizen movements wanted.
Citizen protest like that in West Berlin did result in substantive changes to the
planning process. Since the 1970s, a wide range of building, planning, and environmental
legislation has mandated grassroots involvement in decision making.18 Environmental
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impact tests, which incorporate public participation, have been required for particular
projects since 1985. EU-level initiatives such as Local Agenda 21 have encouraged local
governments to include residents in planning for sustainable development. 1998
amendments to the Federal Planning Law and more recent administrative guidelines have
continued the trend. A broad range of societal actors has participated in working groups
or steering committees that have collaborated informally with legislative and bureaucratic
policy makers, exchanging information and recommendations.19 Mediation has become
more common as a non-confrontational way to resolve differences. Futures workshops
bring different participants together to conceptualize new projects such as green belts
surrounding urban areas.20
Rainer Stierand writes that a new constellation of actors is especially noticeable in
planning for major technical projects like nuclear power plants and toxic waste dumps.
Not only is the circle of participants larger, but their interaction has changed; citizen
initiative groups and environmental organizations have taken their place as "conflict
partners" next to industry and economy representatives.21 He says the term
"corporatism", commonly used to describe the kind of cooperation that occurs in
planning, no longer captures the range of actors, which, next to the large, entrenched
labor and capital organizations of the classical model, also now includes a wide array of
individuals and groups that did not need to be taken into account in this form before the
protests of the 1970s. It also fails to capture the nature of the interaction. These are not
just NIMBY protesters; they are informed participants in the process. The government's
role in these new forms of decision making is often a good deal less authoritative than the
corporatist model of the 1970s would indicate. Instead, government organs now
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commonly function more as managers, mediators, advisors, or monitors. We have seen
in the West Berlin case that this transition occurred largely because of citizen protest.
Some municipal governments, including Berlin's, have actively sought
cooperation with urban protest groups that mobilized successfully against development
projects in the 1970s and early 80s. Tight budgets during the Kohl years forced them to
look for ways to lower costs, such as bringing in citizen groups to help implement their
programs.22 Planners and applicants have generally cooperated in the measures to enhance
local participation. Many projects require long-term investment and long-term planning
efforts. Recognizing that a project may be delayed or derailed altogether by citizen
protest, applicants now put more effort into averting such protest and working to
legitimate their plans by promoting citizen involvement.
We have seen how grassroots protest in West Berlin and throughout West
Germany led to changes in the role of citizens in planning. What have been the lasting
results of that activism? What forms does citizen participation take today in planning,
and how are these similar to or different from those of the earlier decades? Returning to
the Berlin case, we will see that, despite the innovations in the process that the earlier
movements achieved, it has proved difficult to create a consistently inclusive
conversation about planning in the united city.

Land-Use Planning Controversies in Berlin Since 1990
In 1990, Berlin found itself politically united and with a newly accessible
hinterland, two enormous challenges to land-use planning. East Germans had their own
experiences with land-use planning whose legacy is still felt. Discontentment over
environmental wrongs compounded their disenchantment with what was viewed as
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dehumanizing residential planning and likely contributed to the downfall of the East
German regime.23 With unification, city planning had to be rethought from the ground
up. The public showed great interest in how the new Berlin would look, and the Senate
took pains to initiate a general conversation. The City Forum was launched in 1990 as an
advisory body to the Senator for City Planning and Environmental Protection.24 Run by a
steering committee of five professional planners, its sixty members - "personalities from
important political venues in the city" - discussed predetermined planning topics before a
largely mute audience. Residents pilloried the City Forum for functioning more as a
legitimating tool for Senate planning than as a public forum. Only after 1995 was its
structure decentralized. The Forum was recently reconvened after a hiatus of several
years. It remains to be seen whether it can become a vehicle for citywide
communication.
One accomplishment of the 1970s movements was to activate parliament as a
locus of discussion. The AL, which formally became part of Alliance 90/The Greens
after unification, has tried to keep planning on the parliamentary agenda and in the public
consciousness. Berlin has had a volatile political party scene, moving from socialdemocratic to conservative-led coalition governments in the 1980s, to a short-lived redgreen coalition of SPD and AL in 1989, to conservative-led "grand coalitions" with the
SPD in the 1990s and finally to a left/center-left coalition of SPD and the revamped
socialist party of the east, PDS, since 2001. None of these coalitions has achieved much
change in the role of parties and parliaments in planning. While the movements have a
continuing liaison to parliament through the Greens, the Greens have been unable to
expand the role of the legislature in planning beyond what they achieved in the 1980s.
While the planning process has become more complex, with more bureaucratic as well as
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more private participants, it is still quite opaque. The trend since the 1990s has been
away from party/parliamentary control and toward public/private partnerships.
It became clear during the Reuter-West controversy that bureaucracy's role in
planning was also problematic, both in coordinating the process and in including citizen
voices. As a city-state with both district and state-level planning authorities, Berlin has
formidable coordination challenges. Recognizing the need for institutional reform, the
Berlin Senate recently began a wide-ranging program of "administrative modernization."
The goal, according to the Senate, is to model government after private business: to
streamline its organization and outsource some of its functions, to increase its flexibility
and responsiveness, and to reduce inefficiencies. One of the targeted sources of
inflexibility and inefficiency was the micromanagement of bureaucratic action by the
political branch. The Senate aimed to remove the parliament from the day-to-day
functioning of the administration, having it guide the administration instead through
general agreements about goals.25 Ironically, this was exactly the institutional avenue that
the activists of the 1970s had opened up - they had forced parliaments to take up their
function as overseer of the bureaucracy and to lead a discussion of goals as well as the
appropriate means for achieving them. The latest reforms seemed aimed at preserving
the goal-setting function while putting the details back in the hands of the bureaucracy,
thereby restoring some of the technocratic features the activists had tried to curtail.
The Senate also took steps to improve lateral communication between
bureaucratic branches. In the Reuter-West case, the state government's new
environmental responsibilities complicated and lengthened the approval process.
Construction authorities had to consider environmental effects in their deliberations, and
environmental permits were now required under federal law. As more bureaucratic
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authorities have become involved in planning, and more efforts have been made to
decentralize the process, the interval from application to construction has skyrocketed.
Werner Klinge writes about the construction plan approval process in the western Berlin
district of Charlottenburg, where the average length of the process is now eight years and
four months. This extraordinary slowness cannot be blamed on increased citizen
participation requirements. It is more the result of new district planning responsibilities
and new requirements for coordination between district and state authorities.26 Elizabeth
Strom explains that the local bureaucratic agencies, set up to operate largely
independently of one another, have developed different institutional cultures that are hard
to reconcile.27 The problem we saw in the 1970s of coordinating the work of different
administrative branches has not been solved; if anything it has worsened.
Licensing authorities have, as in the Reuter-West case of the 1970s, often tried to
accelerate the process by exempting applications from some required steps. This poses a
continuing problem for citizen participation. In the Charlottenburg example, says
Klinge, consensus among the political and bureaucratic authorities is so difficult to
achieve that the construction authorities often issue legally questionable exemptions in
order to keep the process moving. But such actions weaken the legitimacy of
construction decisions, just as they did in the past.28
Outsourcing is supposed to help alleviate red tape and improve lateral
communication in the bureaucracy. A form of outsourcing was used in the
redevelopment of Adlershof in the 1990s. Adlershof is a large, mixed-use area of
southeastern Berlin. The Senate wanted to site a large business and science park there
which would also include university institutes and even housing. The mix of uses
mandated the participation of several branches of the state administration, and, according
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to Katja Simons, conflicts between them plagued the initial stages of the project.29 In
order to alleviate the problems of coordinating bureaucratic activity and to consolidate
expertise on the details of the complex project, the Senate formed a development agency
to act as trustee for the state government. The Senate would bear the costs and the risks
of the development, but this new entity would make the relevant private contacts and
decisions.30 This was supposed to accelerate the process and make it more flexible and
closer to market actors. But it also removed the process from popular control, thus
reintroducing the legitimation problem. As Berlin's economy stagnated in the 1990s, the
development authority insisted on ever more control and greater public investment.
Neither the Senate nor the Berlin parliament could monitor the increasingly controversial
investment effectively. The creation of the development agency was an attempt to
circumvent hierarchical, inflexible planning in the name of efficiency. The legitimacy of
the project suffered, however, from a lack of accountability.
Even where citizen participation requirements are fulfilled, the timing of the
participation may nullify its effectiveness. Simons says the formal citizen participation in
the Adlershof project was designed mostly to win consensus for decisions already made.
With regard to office-space planning in the united city, Uwe Altrock similarly finds that
the Berlin state government involves the legislature and the public only at a stage where
the important decisions about a project have already been reached.31 This does not mean,
however, that residents' interests are not taken into account at all. Some planning
alternatives are rejected out of hand by the authorities in anticipation of citizen
objections. This practice, says Altrock, distinguishes current planning from that of
previous decades. Those early deliberations are not communicated effectively to the
public, however, which only sees the lack of accommodation in later project stages. The
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difference from the 1970s is that compromises are made in anticipation of public protest.
The similarity is that the state's attempt to avoid conflict leaves a legitimation deficit with
frustrated citizens, who see no choice but to protest.
The Berlin state bureaucracy has also increasingly tried informal and direct
instruments of cooperation with the movements themselves. Margit Mayer describes
how the Senate in the 1980s promoted cooperation with some of the groups that had
protested in the 1970s, including citizen initiatives, tenant groups, housing activists, and
squatters. The Senate was interested mainly in lowering costs and avoiding conflict with
grassroots groups by outsourcing certain functions directly to them. Some Berlin citizen
groups formed an umbrella organization to try for public funding for their projects.
Aware that the Senate was trying to coopt them, they framed their demands initially in
opposition to the "new voluntarism" of the conservative government.32 The included
groups did tend to become more professionalized, opening new lines of conflict between
them and other, excluded groups. The grassroots scene was thus partially but not entirely
coopted by the bureaucracy.
In sum, the controversies of the earlier decades in Berlin contributed substantially
to the more recent reforms. These include changes in the role of parliaments, efforts to
overcome bureaucratic red tape, and efforts to establish a more direct relationship
between planning/licensing authorities and the public. Not all of these were designed to
allow citizens to take part more substantively. As the above examples show, the efforts
to increase communication with citizens while also increasing efficiency in planning have
been problematic. Despite enhanced citizen participation in formal planning, there is still
no institutionalized forum for a real, ongoing conversation between community residents,
politicians, bureaucrats, and applicants during the planning process. Therefore,
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grassroots mobilization still has an important role to play in forcing a public conversation
about planning and achieving a sense of local control over residents' own destiny. Only
when mass mobilization occurs around an application, Altrock says for the case of office
space planning, do citizen misgivings get much of a hearing; otherwise, residents'
participation in the process is trivialized and their suggestions largely ignored. When
diverse groups come together in protest, such as happened with the "NOlympia"
campaign against Berlin's bid to host the 2000 Olympics, they can force a conversation
about the broader goals of planning. Groups like this "tend to go beyond particular
community interests and...raise questions of democratic planning that urban elites
concerned with interregional and international competitiveness would like to
downplay."33
A good number of the new grassroots groups are in the former East Berlin, where
protest activity has followed a trajectory similar to that in the west.34 Grassroots protest
has also begun to occur more frequently at the edges of the metropolis, and it seems to be
following the familiar pattern in which local groups raise general questions of democracy
and community empowerment. Here, as in the city proper, citizen mobilization has
functioned as a corrective to higher-level and local planning that fails to take the wishes
of local populations into account.
Ulf Matthiesen writes about a citizen movement in Grünow, a municipality on
southeastern edge of Berlin. The local planning authorities had scheduled Grünow for
infill development that included large amounts of residential and commercial
construction. A residents' group mobilized successful protest against the "unecologicaloversized" local development policy and "immoderate" land-use and construction plans.
Reminiscent of the citizen initiative group that opposed Reuter-West, the Grünau
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protesters came to connect a grassroots democratic planning process with ecologically
sound planning outcomes. They advocated a nonhierarchical, citizen-centered politics
and sustainable development. This normative position, says Matthiesen, widened their
mobilization potential.35 Recognizing the need for unified regional planning, the states of
Berlin and Brandenburg had combined their planning authorities in 1995. In keeping
with the land-use politics of the more recent period, the Grünau group forged a strategic
alliance with planners in the joint Berlin/Brandenburg administration, who looked
askance at the outsized development plans proffered by the local government. Activists
needed both grassroots protest and cooperation with government actors to achieve their
goals.

Results of Land-Use Planning Controversies Since 1990 in Berlin and Nationwide
Some of the issues that inspired the grassroots protest of the 1970s in Berlin
remain unresolved, and recent trends have focused renewed public attention on them.
The Berlin case reflects nationwide trends in planning policy and citizen participation.
Primary among the ongoing issues is the difficulty of finding an institutional forum for
citizen participation. The Greens still advocate for environmental and community
interests. But their success in activating parliament as supervisor of planning is
threatened by the new trend toward outsourcing planning functions. Moreover, political
parties are increasingly problematic as public mouthpieces for community concerns.
Party membership has dropped off, and voter participation has declined steadily in Berlin
and elsewhere since the 1970s.36 In a recent survey, only 32 per cent of respondents said
they could imagine joining a political party, while 51 per cent said they'd consider joining
a citizens' action group.37 Unmediated forms of local citizen participation, such as
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referenda, are becoming more popular. Many states also now permit the pooling of votes
on the ballot, which allows citizens to vote for candidates from more than one party or
candidates not at the top of the party list. Direct election of mayors has strengthened the
office of mayor vis a vis local councils at the expense of party influence.
Declining interest in political parties and in partisan elections does not mean
declining participation per se. In Berlin, citizen mobilization around land-use issues has
continued. This is true of Germany generally, both with land use and with other issues
advocated by new social movements. Contrary to expectations, writes Dieter Rucht,
"such movements have maintained their resources and infrastructures and even grown in
some domains, such as environmental protection."38 Moreover, the structures and forms
of protest popularized by citizen initiatives have now been adopted by some mainstream
groups - such as police unions and professional groups - who never shared the broader
ideological critique raised by the protest movements. Where parties and bureaucracy are
increasingly viewed with suspicion, these less formal instruments are becoming more
popular: "Political involvement is hardly decreasing, but it is being channelled less and
less by large, formal organisations. Instead, more flexible, looser, more contingent forms
of engagement have become attractive, particularly among the younger generations.
This trend keeps movement politics alive and generates issues that are hard for parties
and interest groups to adopt."39
Citizens' declining interest in formal organizations coincides with the
government's efforts to promote informal planning instruments and cooperation with
private actors in the planning process. Their success can be judged in part by their
popularity: according to one estimate, such informal instruments now outnumber the
official regional planning bodies four to one.40 With the amendment of the Land-Use
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Planning Law in 1998, state and regional planning officials were instructed to promote
cooperation between the public and private actors crucial to the successful
implementation of land-use plans.
Everybody pays lip service to citizen involvement; that is a result of the protests
of the 1970s and 80s. But the government's main goal in promoting the new cooperative,
informal relationships is economic efficiency, while the activists' goal is more direct
democracy. These two goals do not work in the same direction, as we see in the Berlin
case. "On the whole it is clear," writes Katja Simons, "that the implementation of large
projects depends on certain prerequisites that systematically violate important criteria for
democratic legitimation, such as transparence, accessibility, and participation."41 The
new attempts to streamline bureaucracy in the direction of informal planning
arrangements and private/public partnerships have sometimes produced the familiar
result that local communities feel disempowered. In Berlin, part of the streamlining
effort has involved reducing the parliament's intervention in planning. Less
parliamentary oversight of bureaucracy, however, means potentially less citizen voice;
certain organized groups will have more direct influence, but there will be less of a
connection to the citizenry in general.
It is clear that planners must now take greater pains to justify their incursions into
the community. This has resulted in red tape; the evidence from Berlin indicates that it is
increased bureaucratic complexity, however, rather than citizen participation, that has
produced this result. As the responsibilities of the administrative branch increase, the
participants in its decision processes try to come to agreement through informal means.
We saw this in the Adlershof, Charlottenburg and office space examples in Berlin. While
the structure of government in Berlin makes the problem especially acute, this dynamic is
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also evident in Germany generally. According to Rainer Stierand, applicants often meet
informally beforehand with planning authorities to resolve major conflicts in advance of
the formal process. This saves time and money but limits substantive public
participation. By the time the process is opened up for input from residents, the
authorities are ready to sign off on the project; citizen participation is just window
dressing. "If, next to the legal and grassroots [avenues], the parliamentary possibility for
control is also lacking, the opposite of openness in the planning process may be
achieved."42 Thus, points out Stierand, the supposedly completely new ways of planning
that have arisen through privatization and the shrinking of state responsibility in certain
areas actually present some of the same challenges to substantive citizen participation
that the old, expert-oriented policy making of the 1970s did. They raise the legitimation
problem anew: "Ever more urgent is the question of how...possibilities for democratic
control can be retained [within] the new systems of negotiation and the new functions of
the bureaucracies."43
For these reasons, in Berlin and elsewhere, grassroots protest continues to be a
necessary supplement to more institutionalized forms of participation. The Reuter-West
example from the 1970s and the Grünau example from the 1990s suggest that protest is
important not only for democratic politics, but also for appropriate community planning.
The siting battle over Reuter-West provoked a continuing discussion about what physical
spaces (such as the forest area the plant would have bisected) are most important for the
quality of life in the city. Citizen activism helped scale down what would have been an
oversized plant inappropriate to actual energy demand and destructive to West Berlin's
limited open space. Local mobilization often forces applicants and government
authorities to make better use of existing resources and conditions and to integrate
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projects better into the community. Without such mobilization, planning decisions are
made that may exacerbate the disorientation that rapid change has already wrought. Aside
from the mitigating the physical impacts of development, citizen protest movements also
try to shore up community in the face of what they see as dehumanizing bureaucratic and
economic processes. In the Reuter-West case, the citizen group critiqued not only the
project at hand, but also the "industrial-technocratic growth society" that produced it.
Matthiesen writes that some of the new groups at Berlin's eastern edges are trying to
reassert a local identity against Europeanization and globalization processes and against
planning decisions far removed from local context. Contrary to those forces that seem to
break down solidarity and belonging, these groups initiate a "re-embedding process" that
asserts "here are my new roots."44
Elsewhere in Germany, local involvement has also helped forestall or reshape
projects that, in retrospect, higher-level authorities agree would have been destructive to
local communities. Konukiewitz and Wollmann cite the example of urban renewal,
where "the trend towards rehabilitation of old buildings instead of their replacement has
been brought about mainly by neighborhood residents protesting their removal and by
planners who sympathised with them."45 Another example is spatial policy, where
postwar state and federal governments tried to bolster lagging rural regions by developing
an infrastructure to rival that of the more industrialized regions. Environmental groups
have successfully fought off such policies in an effort to preserve an ecological balance in
an already heavily populated and industrialized country. Blanket industrialization and
urbanization in order to equalize economic conditions among the German federal states is
no longer considered a worthwhile goal. Local input has moved higher-level authorities
to the viewpoint that developing or preserving particular special assets of a region -
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natural assets included - can both help economically and preserve a sense of local
character that keeps communities vital.

Conclusion
Citizen protest over three decades, in Berlin and in Germany generally, has
achieved some important changes in land-use planning. For one, it has delegitimated
technocratic planning. Citizen initiative groups have legitimated grassroots participation
and activated parliaments as a locus for a broad discussion of the goals as well as means
of policy making. Citizen input has also been institutionalized in planning. There is now
an expectation of local participation that makes the new land-use politics different from
the old. The struggle for a long-term forum for substantive discussion of land-use issues,
however, continues. On the one hand it is clear that citizen objections are anticipated
and the concept of citizen participation is taken seriously; on the other hand, this
anticipation has led to new bureaucratic attempts to circumvent interaction with citizens
which, combined with the general trend toward divesting parliaments of their duties to
monitor the bureaucracy, look to many residents like a withdrawal of access to dialogue
over planning. The expanded citizen participation requirements of the permit process
have led to attempts to anticipate citizen responses without actually involving citizens.
This has left in some cases a legitimation deficit that will be hard to correct without
finding a setting for real, ongoing political discussion between all the participants.
Grassroots citizen protest is still a necessary companion and corrective to the
institutionalized planning process. The Berlin case helps explain why, despite new
opportunities for direct cooperation with planning authorities, protest mobilization
persists.
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This article has put the planning literature in the broader context of changes in
participatory democracy. What connects the importance of these groups as social
movements to their importance as participants in planning is their commitment to
empowering citizens to shape their own communities. The Berlin story helps explain
Rucht's observation that protest mobilization did not die out after the boom of the 1970s
and 80s, but rather has become part of the repertoire of citizen initiative groups and part
of the normal planning process. Protest often seems both more effective in individual
cases and more legitimate to the public than party and bureaucratic channels.
The protests of the 1970s and 80s encouraged lay citizens to take a substantive
role in deciding issues that were previously considered the purview of technical experts.
Our analysis of land-use planning in a single city over time highlights this important but
under-studied result of grassroots citizen mobilization. This result will prove lasting only
if the public remains mobilized and informed. The new trend toward privatization, while
making the state less authoritative in some ways, ironically makes the public less
empowered in others. The informal inclusion of certain mobilized groups helps those
groups to become part of the process, but it does little to inform the citizenry generally.
Authorities can no longer cite the technical nature of decisions in order to exclude the
public, but economic efficiency concerns and a preference for private interaction may
achieve the same result. The failure to find an institutional home for grassroots
participation may prove a detriment to German democracy in the long run. At the very
least, it necessitates continued protest mobilization in order that community voices be
heard and that democratizing demands be taken seriously.
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